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1. INTRODUCTION

-

The death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016 led to
the biggest workplace law "non-event" of the United States Supreme
Court's October Term 2015 - the nine-word judgment handed down
on March 29, 2016, in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association:
"The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court."'
The tie-vote without an opinion meant that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals's adherence to existing Supreme Court precedent
on the constitutionality of agency fee statutes ended the Friedrichs
case. As discussed below, the summary affirmance did not settle the
debate or the litigation about agency fee that has been going for
decades, but it did ensure that the issue will not return to the Court
until a ninth Justice is confirmed by the Senate.
Although the Friedrichs case was the most noted of the Term,
there were several others that were important to the development of
workplace law in cases involving constitutional, statutory, and
procedural issues. This article will also focus on unresolved myths
that will persist after the Court's deadlocked decision in Friedrichs.
Many other workplace law cases decided during the past Term,
however, lacked sharp divisions, with some approaching near
unanimity. Workplace law cases are unlikely to be accepted until the
Court has nine members. Even though four justices can vote to accept
a case, they are less likely to do so when the chances of a four to four
deadlock are greater. According to statistics compiled by
SCOTUSblog, the pace of cases granted certiorari in October Term
2016 is below average both for recent terms and the minimum
distribution required for a full calendar.2 Workplace law cases already
represent a relatively small portion of the Court's docket; they are at
most 10 percent of the cases heard each term.3 Thus the current
vacancy on the Court will further stunt the development of the
doctrine in an area of life most important to millions of Americans
1. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016).
2. Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG, <http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/> (last visited Dec. 3,
2016) (scroll down to "Pace of Grants" table).
3. In October Term 2015, the Court heard 81 cases on the merits with 8 of those being
labor and employment law cases. October Term 2015: The Statistics, 130 HARV. L. REV. 507 n.a
(2016). There were two Title VII cases, two ERISA cases, and two First Amendment cases
(Friedrichsand Heffernan). Once case involved the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) (Encino Motor Cars), and another involved a class action brought under the FLSA
(Tyson Foods). Id. at 518-520.
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the workplace.
The October 2015 Term of the United States Supreme Court will
likely be most remembered for the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia
and the gridlock on the Court that it created, rather than workplace
law cases. But there were several consequential workplace law
decisions, and, of course, projections about the impact on the law of
work of a new Justice and a new President of the United States. But
the issues and debates that produced right-to-work litigation will not
go away with the Court's split decision in Friedrichs.
Even with an eight-member court, there were only three other cases
where the court was "equally divided" and the court judgment below
was affirmed with a nine-word judgment.4 The most impactful of
these three was the Court's decision to let stand the Fifth Circuit's
judgment in Texas v. United States, thereby continuing the nationwide
injunction freezing President Obama's plan to regularize the status of
the parents of undocumented children. This has an impact on the
millions of undocumented workers present in the country until there
is political movement in Washington for immigration reform.
Then, there were the consequential merits decisions upholding
the University of Texas's affirmative action policy, and the Texas
abortion case Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstadt -which will both
impact workplace dynamics in different ways.6 In Fisher v. Texas, the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Grutter v. University of Michigan and
upheld the University of Texas's diversity admissions program.' The
Whole Women's Health case invigorated the undue burden standard
which prevented abortion regulations that have the purpose or effect
of preventing women from obtaining legal abortion." Both of these
cases will have an impact on the place of women and minorities in the
workforce.
With the changes coming at the Court now that Donald Trump
has been elected President, most of the popular debate is focused on
what is ahead - both for the Court and the administrative agencies
4. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band
Choctaw Tribe Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 136 S.
Ct. 1072 (2016) (affirming by an equally divided court the Eighth Circuit holding that Equal
Credit Opportunity Act did not apply to spouses of applicants for loans who were not a part of
the credit transaction).
5. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146-49, 177-86 (5th Cir. 2015).
6. Fisher v. The University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Whole Women's
Health v Hellersteadt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
7. 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
8. 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
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that make up the bulk of its workload. But there are important
statutory cases from the 2015-16 Term to review. As with last Term,
there were statutory cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). As
discussed below, the relationship between the administrative agencies
and the courts continued to be a major theme of the term. These
cases involved the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In this past Term,
there again was no case involving the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) - displaying the relative lack of collective bargaining
in the private sector economy.
For those who think the personnel on the Supreme Court matter
more than who is in the White House or Congress, this Term
provided a reminder of the Senate's "advice and consent" role. 9 The
President nominated to the Court Merrick Brian Garland, the Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Judge Garland's nomination has stalled for more
than 150 days - a new record.o This stalemate sharply highlights the
connections between the Court and politics.
Before he passed away on February 13, 2016, Justice Scalia had
been on the Court since 1986 and had participated in dozens of cases
involving workplace law. In this Term, he had participated in oral
arguments in six of the nine workplace law cases that this Article will
discuss, but he was only part of the decision in two of them. I will
leave others to discuss the legacy of Justice Scalia in his thirty years of
workplace law cases. Although I primarily discuss below Scalia's
impact on the cases this term, both before and after his death, in the
conclusion, I will discuss the ramifications of the new Supreme Court
on the future of workplace law.
II. WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION CASES

A. Friedrichs v. CTA: Union Dues and the FirstAmendment

-

By nature of the Court's limited jurisdiction and review,
Supreme Court cases often involve the "workplace constitution"
and this Term was no exception. I will start with the most anticipated
case of October Term 2015 - the tie decision in Friedrichs v.
9. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
10. Ruben J. Garcia, Editorial, Founders Gave No Veto to the Senate, RENO GAZETTE-J.,
Mar. 20, 2016, at E4.
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California Teachers Association (CTA). If the plantiffs and the
organizations backing them had been successful, the decision would
have used the Constitution to make the entire nation "right to work"
in the public sector.
Rebecca Friedrichs is a teacher in Orange County California who
objected to having to pay an agency fee to the California Teachers
Association (CTA) for representation services." She withdrew from
membership but was still required to pay the costs of grievance
administration and collective bargaining. She argued that despite not
having to pay for political organizing, she was still forced to subsidize
the union's bargaining demands, which she also believed were
political. She and nine other teachers filed suit against the CTA
alleging that their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
association had been violated for having to pay the agency fee. 12
The District Court and the Ninth Circuit ruled against the
plaintiffs, citing the binding U.S. Supreme Court decision in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, which had held that it was not a First
Amendment violation to require public school teachers to pay an
agency fee to the union that represents them.13 Since 1977, the Abood
precedent has served as the constitutional basis for the agency fee
statutes in more than twenty-one states, including California.14 The
statutes allow the union to charge nonmembers an agency fee for the
cost of grievance processing and collective bargaining. Nonmembers
are never charged for supporting political candidates, but expenses
related to grievance processing and collective bargaining are
chargeable."
Although the decision was a four to four tie after the death of
Justice Scalia, the prospects did not look good for the CTA at the
argument before the Supreme Court in January 2016. There were
several questions at argument that foreshadowed the expected battles
in the years to come as Friedrichs-type litigation percolates up the
chain. The following misconceptionns voiced by various justices at the
11. Complaint at 4, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS, 2013 WL
9825479 (C. D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013).
12. Id. at 1-7.
13. Friedrichs,No. SACV 12-676-JLS, 2013 WL 9825749, at **2-3 (citing Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), aff'd, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18,
2014).
14. Mike Antonucci, Teachers Unions at Risk of Losing "Agency Fees", EDUC. NEXT,
Winter 2016, at 23, 24, 27, available at <http://educationnext.org/files/ednextXVI 1
antonucci.pdf>.
15. Abood, 431 U.S. at 220-32, 234.
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oral argument suggest myths that will continue to cloud the litigation
on these issues.1
1. "Everything Government Unions Do Is Political"
Justice Scalia's statement went straight to the heart of the
plaintiffs' argument: "The problem is that everything that is
collectively bargained with the government is within the political
sphere, almost by definition."1 7 The premise that everything a
government union does is political does not apply to the many
mundane things that the plaintiffs are asked to pay for in collective
bargaining agreements that were presented to the court in appendices
to the briefs. Justice Anthony Kennedy at one point in the argument
read a laundry list of items that had public policy implications - merit
pay, seniority, grievance procedures - but neglected to mention a
multitude of noncontroversial items, such as breaks, mileage
reimbursement, and professional development that are also subjects
of bargaining."
This new emphasis on the political aspects of bargaining would
seem a strange departure from the Court's prior precedents. In Smith
v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, the Court held that
collective bargaining with the state was not speech under the First
Amendment, and thus the State's decision not to entertain bargaining
with certain employees (in that case, state highway employees) was
not a constitutional problem.1 9 Further, in Borough of Duryea v
Guarnieri, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that a town
police chief's grievance was not a matter of speech but instead
implicated the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, and even
then was not a matter of public concern.20 How can bargaining not be
a matter of constitutional concern in those cases brought by unions
and union members, and suddenly implicate major constitutional
concerns when the speech claim is brought by those who dissent from
the union? Is it, as Justice Stephen Breyer asked during oral
16. I previously discussed these misconceptions at the blog

HAMILTON AND GRIFFIN ON

RIGHTS. Ruben J. Garcia, Five Myths from the Oral Argument in Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Jan. 12, 2016), <https://hamiltongriffin.com/2016/01/12/five-myths-from-the-oral-argument-in-friedrichs-v-california-teachers-ass
ociation-by-ruben-j-garcia/>.
17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 1083

(2016).
18. Id. at 66.
19. 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979).
20. 564 U.S. 379, 387, 389-99 (2011).
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argument, essentially, whether a special constitutional rule was being
created just to harm labor unions?21 Clearly, this misconception had
taken hold among five of the Justices, clouding prospects for CTA to
prevail.
2. "Private Sector Exclusive Representation Is Not at Issue"
The federalism implications of a decision striking down agency
fees nationwide when twenty-one states have found them to be a
positive and efficient way of organizing labor relations received less
attention than the possible implications for the private sector, at least
during the argument.22 Federal labor laws have been upheld against
constitutional challenges by groups such as the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation (NRTW) numerous times over the
years, even when the only state action involved is the government
statute allowing agency shop, and the court or administrative action
needed to enforce it.23 In arguing the case for petitioners, attorney
Michael Carvin dismissed the possible success of a constitutional
challenge to the statutes permitting agency shop - the National Labor
Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act.24 The NRTW, however,
has several challenges based on the theories of Friedrichs and Harris
v. Quinn.25 Harris was the challenge to the Illinois agency fee law the
NRTW brought to the Supreme Court in 2014 where the Court first
refused the invitation to overturn the 1977 case upholding the
constitutionality of agency fees in the public sector, Abood v Detroit
Board of Education.26 Abood represents the accommodation between
exclusive representation and the rights of dissenters to pay on the
costs of collective bargaining.27
Even after the continued existence of Abood, there are several
21. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 19.
22. See id. at 70-72 (raising the issue of disruption to the states but not getting any followup questions on that).
23. See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW
DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2015); Karl E. Klare, The Public/PrivateDistinction in Labor Law,
130 U. PA. L REV. 1358 (1982).
24. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 6-7.
25. E.g., Complaint, Berman v. Brown, No. 6:16-cv-02108 (D. Ore. Nov. 2, 2016); Notice of
Appeal, Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State Cty. & Munic. Emps., No. 16-3638 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016);
see also Homecare Workers File Federal Class Action Lawsuit Against the State of Washington,
NAT'L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2016), <http://www.nrtw.
org/news/homecare-workers-file-federal-class-action-lawsuit-against-the-state-of-washingtonl0
242016/> (describing the case brought by the NRTW and stating that it was one of several
brought in Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Oregon and Washington state).
26. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct 2618, 2627, 2638 (2014).
27. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977).
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challenges to exclusive representation still in the pipeline.28 Although
the court has tried to cabin the constitutional implications of its labor
law decisions in private sector cases like Communication Workers of
America v. Beck 29 and International Association of Machinists v.
Street,30 an older precedent under the Railway Labor Act would likely
cause the court to reexamine the constitutional implications of
government mandated exclusive representation.31 In Steele v.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad, the Court dealt with the
constitutional concerns of state-aided railroad unions discriminating
on the basis of race by finding a duty of fair representation implicit in
the union's role as exclusive bargaining representative.32 That duty
continues to be the quid pro quo for exclusive representation and
agency fees to the union in the private and public sectors, and it
would be at risk if the constitutional basis for agency fees was struck
down by the Court in Friedrichs.
3. "Inability to Collect Agency Fees Does Not Lead to Weaker
Unions"
Much discussion during the argument involved whether public
employee unions would "collapse" if Friedrichs won, as Chief Justice
John Roberts put it.33 "I see no connection whatever between - what
the city is willing [to] give in collective bargaining and whether you
have agency fees," said Justice Scalia during the argument.34 Labor
advocates know that the question is not whether public employee
unions will be extinct, but whether they will be effective without
having the ability to collect dues on the front end and entertain
request rebates, versus having to pursue reimbursement for their
costs of grievance administration and collective bargaining after
nonmembers have already received the benefits of bargaining. While
there are certainly examples of unions that have thrived in right to
work states (one example being the Culinary Workers Union in
Nevada), the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that unions are

28. Charlotte Garden, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association and Why We Need
Nine, AM. CONSTITUTION Soc'Y (Mar. 30, 2016), <http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/friedrichs-vcalifornia-teachers-association-why-we-need-nine>.
29. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
30. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
31. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
32. Id. at 202-03.
33. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 57.
34. Id. at 60.
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weaker in states where they must chase members for dues, not just in
the political arena but also at the bargaining table.35
4. "Opt-out Is Not as Easy as It Seems"
Justice Alito questioned how easy opt-out is, 3 6 recalling the need

to send a certified letter from Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, an opinion
he authored, where the Court held that the union was required to get
affirmative permission for a "political fight back fund" rather than
simply rebating the amounts with which bargaining unit employees
disagreed.37 It seemed inapposite to being able to opt-in or out of
bargaining.
Public employees like Ms. Friedrichs, who have refused to join
the union have already opted out - the remaining questions simply
concern what is chargeable and what is not chargeable. They have
opted out from all union activities except paying for the cost of
grievance administration and collective bargaining, for which they are
seeking reimbursement in this case. It seems a minimal burden to
place on employees who wish to uphold the "right to work," or as I
prefer, the "right to free ride."
5. "A Whole Class of Persons Whose Speech Has Been Silenced"
In one exchange with CTA attorney David Frederick, who
argued on behalf of the Union Respondents, Justice Kennedy
expressed concern that a "whole class of persons [was having their]
speech . .
silenced, not just one person."38 The question
misunderstands the majoritarian nature of a union. Most members
have no quarrel with smaller class sizes, layoffs based on seniority,
and higher wages (90 percent of CTA covered teachers are full
members of the union).3 9 Indeed, minorities should have democratic
dissenting rights within the union, but agency fee statutes and the
Court's cases already allow dissenters to refuse to subsidize views that
they do not agree with in everything from unions to bar associations
to student organizations.40
Further, during this exchange, Justice Kennedy turned his back
35. On the Culinary Union in right to work Nevada, see, for example, Ruben J. Garcia,
Politics at Work After Citizens United, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2015).
36. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 68.
37. Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2297 (2012).
38. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 66.
39. See id. at 67-68.
40. See id. at 28.

206

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 20:197

on case precedents, some that he authored, which allowed the
government greater latitude to balance First Amendment rights to
provide for the efficient role of government as employer. Kennedy
tried to distinguish these cases on the ground that they only dealt with
one person - the deputy district attorney in Garcetti v. Ceballos41 or
the school teacher in Pickering v Board of Education42 - whereas
agency fee statutes deal with a large number of dissenters. In fact,
relatively few of those in the CTA's bargaining unit eligible to resign
actually do.44 Perhaps they recognize the value of collective
bargaining agreements and of participation in the union's governance
structures, or perhaps they are unaware of their right to withdraw,
45
even though agency fee statutes require notice of that right be given.
Justice Kennedy elided the large number of union members
whose speech is silenced. If bargaining with the government is found
to be constitutionally protected political speech, perhaps the Court
will revisit its holdings in Smith and Guarnieri, discussed above,
where the Court held respectively that 1) excluding certain workers
from bargaining did not raise First Amendment concerns; 46 and 2)
that a town police chief's grievance for overtime pay was not a matter
of public concern under the petition clause.47 Or, perhaps as discussed
above, it would overturn Steele which imposed a duty to represent
nonmembers fairly, 48 since there would no longer be "state
compulsion" for the members to be represented. All of those would
be a worse and more disruptive outcome than what might have
occurred, but these issues will again be on the table the next time the
issue comes before the Court, after a ninth justice is seated.
B. Heffernan v. City of Paterson: PoliticalRetaliation
Friedrichs was not the only constitutional case involving public
employment this Term. The Heffernan case involved a Paterson, New
Jersey police officer who went to pick up a lawn sign for his mother in

41. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
42. 391 U.S. 568 (1968).
43. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 56.
44. See id. at 67-68.
45. See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 304-08 (1986)
(analyzing procedures to give notice to objecting members of the bargaining unit and allow for
funds not to be collected for objected-to activities).
46. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 466 (1979).
47. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 399 (2011).
48. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
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the local mayoral election. When other officers saw Heffernan with
the sign and told his supervisors, they allegedly put him on an
undesirable beat.49
Justice Scalia was on the bench when Heffernan v. City of
Paterson was argued on January 19, 2016.0 The oral argument looked
bad for the employee, but ended as a six to two victory for the
employee, so Scalia's vote would not have been determinative." At
oral argument, Justice Scalia was skeptical of the idea that Heffernan
could bring a First Amendment retaliation claim since he had not
52
supported the candidate who opposed the mayor in the election.
Justice Scalia asked how it was possible that an employee who did not
oppose the mayor's election could be retaliated against for opposing
the mayor in the election.53 Of course, the case turned on whether the
City could be liable for retaliation against the police officer based on
the Mayor's mistaken belief that officer Heffernan had supported his
opponent. As a result, Heffernan was placed on a less-desirable beat.
He sued, alleging that the change in working conditions had been
because of his perceived support for the Mayor's opponent.54 The
District Court and the Third Circuit held that the dismissal of the
claim was proper, and Heffernan appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 1, 2015.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer,
ruled that Heffernan did indeed state a retaliation claim under the
First Amendment.56 The fact that Heffernan himself did not support
the mayor's opponent did not change the fact that the mayor aimed to
chill political activity against him in the City of Paterson.
The rule announced by the Court broadens the possibility of
retaliation claims:
When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent
the employee from engaging in political activity that the First
Amendment protects - that employee is entitled to challenge that
49. Heffernan v City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct 1412, 1416 (2016).
50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct 1412 (2016).
51. See 136 S. Ct at 1415.
52. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 50, at 5-7.
53. See id. at 5.
54. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
55. Id. at 1416-17; Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct 29 (2015).
56. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418-19.
57. Id. at 1419; see Paul Secunda & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Citizens Coerced: A
Legislative Fix for Workplace PoliticalIntimidation Post-Citizens United, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2016).
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unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
even if, as here, the employer makes a factual mistake about the
employee's behavior. 8
The Heffernan case is one of a string of Supreme Court cases in
recent years about workplace retaliation. It remains to be seen how
useful it will be as an anti-retaliation protection for political activities
in government employment, or if it is just an odd situation unlikely to
be repeated very often in the future. In most election years, most of
the potentially retaliatory actions exist in the private sector.5 9 Thus,
we must wait and see if there are any future workplace law cases
arising out of this election where this precedent might be of use.

III. THE ROLE OF AGENCIES IN THE TWILIGHT OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION: STATUTORY CASES, THE DOL AND EEOC

The next set of cases have a common theme in workplace law
cases - the role of administrative agencies in drawing the boundaries
of the law enacted by the legislative branch. Many of these issues
have accelerated with the approaching end of the Obama
Administration, but the President's authority to engage on many of
the issues must be tested in future terms.
A. Title VII Cases: Green and CRST Van Expedited Inc.
The issue in Green v. Brennan involved when the clock begins
ticking for the purposes of Title VII for federal employees to bring a
constructive discharge discrimination claim - when the employee
signs an agreement to retire or accept another position in a remote
location, or when the employee actually resigns.60 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the claim was untimely based on the date
of the agreement rather than the actual resignation date.6 1
The standard rule for limitation periods requires the court to
determine when is the "complete and present cause of action."6 2 The
Court held that the employee's constructive discharge claim was a
discriminatory act that started the clock ticking when the employee
gives notice of his resignation. The Court ruled this way for two
58. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
59. See, e.g,, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Paul M. Secunda, Citizens Coerced: A
Legislative Fix for Political Intimidation During Elections Post-Citizens United, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 5-7 (2016) (citing examples at Cintas & Georgia Pacific).
60. 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2016).
61. Id. at 1775.
62. Id. at 1776.
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reasons. First, in a constructive discharge, the resignation is part of
the complete cause of action for wrongful termination. Second,
nothing in the regulation providing for the cause of action precluded
63
the counting of the resignation for purposes of statute of limitations.
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, and interestingly used
the Court's controversial decision in Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire to
help explain why the resignation date should start the tolling of the
clock.' The Court's Ledbetter opinion was legislatively reversed by
the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 65 but in this case, Alito seems to say
that the precedent can help plaintiffs, like Green.66
Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter, focusing on the need to
utilize the counseling service of the EEOC.67 This theme of utilizing
pre-dispute resolution services has recurred in several recent
Supreme Court cases.68 In this case, however, the lack of pre-dispute
counseling was not fatal.
In CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC, the defendant CRST Van
Expedited Lines prevailed in an EEOC enforcement action and
obtained a dismissal for failure to conciliate.69 In that case, CRST
obtained a dismissal of a Title VII case brought against it and sought
attorneys' fees going to a prevailing "party." The Eighth Circuit held
that CRST was not entitled to attorney's fees because there was not a
judgment on the merits.o
The Supreme Court reversed, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Kennedy. Here again, although the argument and the decision
occurred after the death of Justice Scalia, the Court was still
unanimous in its decision." CRST is an example of a decision that did
not have an ideological split that was affected by the death of Justice
Scalia. But its effects are still decidedly pro-defendant.
Both Title VII cases this term dealt with fairly technical issues
that were not affected by the absence of Justice Scalia. However, as
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1782-83 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing among other authorities Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
65. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
66. Green, 136 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1780-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. E.g. CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642 (2016); Mach Mining v. EEOC,
135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015) (concerning the EEOC's obligation to attempt to conciliate before filing
an action).
69. CRST, 136 S. Ct. at 1649.
70. Id. at 1650.
71. Id. at 1645.
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with all Title VII cases, the Court's decisions will delineate the
boundaries of administrative action in the absence of congressional
action on civil rights law until the stalemate in Washington is
changed.
B. Encino Motor Cars LLC v. Navarro: Overtime Exemption
One of the more contested terrains in the Court recently is the
actions of the Department of Labor. In Encino Motor Cars LLC v.
Navarro, the authority of the Department of Labor to interpret one
of the exemptions to the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act was at issue.72 The plaintiffs in this case were "service
writers" - the helpful employees of the auto dealerships who check in
cars and write down the service needs for the car. 73 The case dealt
with whether service advisors are exempt from the overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.74 In the backdrop of the
case, the new overtime exemption rules were being finalized that will
affect many more millions of workers, and which might also come
back to the Court in the years to come.75 As with many of the DOL
initiatives, they have been challenged in the courts and in public
opinion. But this is the consequence when Congress abdicates its
responsibility to modernize the FLSA and other labor statutes.
The Navarro case is one of several Fair Labor Standards Act
cases that have come before the Court in recent years. Other recent
76
cases have dealt with the definition of time worked and class actions.
Going back further, the Court in Christopherv. SmithKline Beecham
72. 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (2016). I wrote about this case for HAMILTON AND GRIFFIN ON
RIGHTS. Ruben J. Garcia, Argument Preview: SCOTUS Decision Will Be the Tip of the FLSA
Iceberg this Summer, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Apr. 21, 2016), <http://hamilton-

griffin.com/argument-preview-scotus-decision-will-be-the-tip-of-the-flsa-iceberg-this-summer-b
y-ruben-j-garcia/>; Ruben J. Garcia, Encino Motorcars LLC v. Navarro: The Regulatory
Pendulum Swings Back to the Department of Labor, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (June

23, 2016), http://hamilton-griffin.com/encino-motorcars-llc-v-navarro-the-regulatory-pendulu mswings-back-to-the-department-of-labor-by-ruben-j-garcia/.
73. Navarro v. Mercedes Benz of Encino, 780 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2015).
74. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2121.
75. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32391 (May 23, 2016) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 541). The rule was to go into effect December 1, 2016, but it has been enjoined by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, No. 4:16-CV-00731 (Nov. 2, 2016). The Department has filed an appeal with the Fifth
Circuit. Important Information Regarding Recent Overtime Litigation in the U.S. District Court
of the Eastern District of Texas, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, <https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime
/final2016/litigation.htm> (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
76. E.g. Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014).
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was more divided, partly because it dealt with the Department of
Labor's authority to exempt pharmaceutical "detailers" - those who
promote products to doctors but lack legal authority to make a sale.'
Justice Breyer wrote a strong dissent from that five to four opinion
about why the Department of Labor's view should receive
deference."
Navarro concerned a narrow part of the existing exemptions
from overtime, but took place in the context of the looming final
DOL rule on the executive, administrative, and professional
exemptions, which will be discussed below.79 The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) exempts from minimum wage and overtime
requirements those employed in a bona fide "executive,
administrative or professional capacity, "outside salesmen" or "any
salesman, partsman or mechanic primarily engaged in the selling or
servicing of automobiles."so The issue in Navarro was whether
"service advisors", usually those friendly employees who greet you,
check you in, and sometimes try to "sell" services, are not required to
be paid time and half their regular rate for hours over forty worked in
a week."
A panel of the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that the service
advisors were not exempt from overtime.82 On January 15, 2016, the
Court agreed to hear the case.83 Whether this case would have been
granted after Justice Scalia's death on February 12 is anyone's guess,
but my guess is that Scalia would have had a field day with the plain
language of the Act: Do the service advisors "sell" anything in the
traditional sense of that word? Do they provide any "parts"? Can
they be considered mechanics if they don't have the certification
required to fix cars? Or, were there four justices who thought that the
Ninth Circuit was insufficiently attuned to the "whole context" of the
service process and thus agreed to hear the case? The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits had found that the service
advisors were exempt from overtime.
77. 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170-73 (2012).
78. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32391 (May 23, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
81. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (2016).
82. Id. at 2124.
83. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016).
84. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2124 (citing Walton v. Greenbriar Ford, Inc., 370
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The FLSA issue was whether "service advisors," were "primarily
engaged in the selling and servicing of automobiles" and thus exempt
from overtime pay." In other words, the key textual question was
whether they were primarily engaged in the servicing of automobiles
- even though they never actually get under the hood or get "their
hands dirty, by "work[ing] as a mechanic's right hand man or
woman," as the brief for the service advisors asserted.86
In the briefing and at the oral argument, most of the attention
focused on the linguistic gymnastics and the dueling canons of
statutory construction that each side believed would win the case. The
case focused on the DOL's pendulum swings since 1970, first holding
in an interpretive regulation that service advisors are not exempt, and
then finding that the courts rejected their position.17 Then, in the
waning days of the George W. Bush Administration, a rulemaking
proposing that service advisors be exempt from overtime was started,
but soon scuttled as the Obama Administration began." In the
meantime, current and former service advisors filed suit in federal
court in Los Angeles against the Encino Motor Cars Group alleging
that the dealership owed them unpaid overtime wages.89
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that
the DOL's justification for the new rule was lacking, since there was
little justification at all due to what was apparently "an inadvertent
mistake in drafting." 90 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit to interpret the statute without giving "controlling weight" to
the DOL's interpretation. 91 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Sotomayor, wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that the DOL
should not be expected to provide a heightened justification for its
conclusions. 2 "'[I]t suffices,"' according to Justice Ginsburg, "'that
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and the agency believes it to be better, which the

F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2004); Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1973)).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b).
86. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2127 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting
Respondents' Brief, 32-35).
87. Id. at 2122-23 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 2123 (citing Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
73 Fed. Reg. 43654 (July 28, 2008) and Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 18832, 18833 (Apr. 5, 2011)).
89. Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 780 F.3d 1267, 1270 (2015).
90. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2124, 2126-27.
91. Id. at 2127.
92. Id. at 2128 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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conscious change of course adequately indicates."93
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, wrote a
dissenting opinion, arguing that there was no need to remand to the
lower court, and the Court should enter judgment for the dealerships
since the FLSA exemption clearly includes service advisors, even
though the words "service advisors" do not appear in the statute.94 In
doing so, the dissent mocked both the distributive canon of
construction favored by the plaintiffs, and the canon that the FLSA
should be construed broadly because it is a remedial statute. Quoting
the late Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Thomas wrote that this view of
the FLSA rests on an "elemental misunderstanding of the legislative
process."95 On the other hand, numerous FLSA opinions by courts
over the last eighty years favoring a broad construction of the statute
suggests that if a canon for broad construction of the FLSA does not
exist in name, it surely exists in practice.
The Court's decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
dealing with service advisors at automobile dealerships, reminds us
that there are many exemptions in the statute that do not depend on
the salary level of the employee, such as being an "outside
salesperson," a "computer employee" or, as in this case, one who is
"primarily engaged in the selling or servicing of automobiles." 96
Unfortunately for the service advisor plaintiffs in the case, six justices
voted to swing the regulatory pendulum back to the DOL to get more
detail about why the DOL currently holds that service advisors
should not be exempt from the coverage of overtime pay, and two
justices voted to end the case and enter judgment for the defendants.
The reason that this case is just the tip of the overtime iceberg is
that President Obama's Department of Labor has raised the annual
salary threshold for all white-collar exemptions workers to $47,460.'
Under the new regulations, workers who earn below that will be
presumptively entitled to overtime pay for hours worked over forty in
a week. The Navarro case is also a challenge to the Department of
Labor's authority, and a similar challenge has already been brought

93. Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009)) (emphasis in
original).
94. Id. at 2128 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2130-31.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012).
97. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32391 (May 23, 2016) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 541).

214

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 20:197

by several states challenging the new salary threshold. 98
On remand, the Ninth Circuit of Appeals again decided that the
service advisors were not exempt from overtime rules, this time
without relying on the Department of Labor's guidance, as instructed
by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit applied an analysis of the
text and purposes of the exemption of sales, parts and mechanic
employees in 1974 to conclude that Congress did not intend to
exempt service advisors. As the Trump Administration begins, the
Supreme Court, or Congress, will soon have a chance to revisit the
mater.
IV. PROCEDURAL CASES IMPACTING WORKPLACE LAW

A. DIRECTV v Imburgia: California Class Arbitration
There were other cases that were procedural, but which will have
an impact on substantive workplace law. Such procedural cases often
have a greater impact on workplace law than many of the substantive
cases. This Term was no exception, with the Court hearing the
Federal Arbitration Act case DIRECTV v. Imburgia. In this case, the
Court granted certiorari to the California court system, which again
had limited the reach of the FAA. 99
On December 14, 2015, the Court, in a six to three opinion,
00
reversed the California Court of Appeal's judgment.o
The argument
and the opinion included Justice Scalia, but the majority opinion was
authored by Justice Breyer, in what appears to be a nod to stare
decisis, as will be discussed below.
DIRECTV had a consumer contract in California that banned
class action arbitration."o1 Several cases over the last decade have
dealt with the issue of class arbitrations, most famously (or
infamously) AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, generally
disfavoring employees and attorneys bringing consumer and
employment class actions.1 Even when state law purported to
98. The rule was to go into effect December 1, 2016, but it has been enjoined by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 4:16CV-00731 (Nov. 2, 2016). The Department has filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit. Important
Information Regarding Recent Overtime Litigation in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern
District of Texas, supra note 75.
99. DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465-66 (2016).
100. Id. at 466.
101. Id.
102. 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see, e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are
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preserve the ability to bring an action, the Court has used the FAA to
preempt contrary state laws.103
The contract at issue in DIRECTV between the consumer and
the company provided that if "the law of your state would find this
agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures
unenforceable"
then the entire arbitration provision was
unenforceable, California held class action waivers unconscionable.1 04
But the Concepcion case, decided five years earlier, made clear that
the FAA prempted California law. When the California court
interpreted "law of your state" to mean California law but not
Concepcion, DIRECTV appealed first to the California Supreme
Court, which denied review, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.os
Justice Breyer, who authored the dissenting opinion in
Concepcion, wrote for the six justices in the majority that although
the law of California did apply, that law could not include California
law, which had been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Concepcion.106 Thus, according to Justice
Breyer, the Court of Appeal's interpretation adhering to California's
unconscionability ruling was preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act.1 07

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion maintaining, as he has
done for nearly twenty years, that the FAA does not apply in state
court.10 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor,
believed that the decision would continue the trend of disempowering
consumers and favoring corporations. 109 Justice Ginsburg seemed
generally to fault her colleagues for going further than Concepcion
required: "Today's decision steps beyond Concepcion and Italian
Colors. There, as here, the Court misread the FAA to deprive
consumers of effective relief against powerful economic entities that
write no-class-action arbitration clauses into their form contracts."110
Although not specifically a case about stare decisis, i.e., the
judicial doctrine of letting precedent stand to not disrupt the
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Depriver Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK L. REV. 1309

(2015).
103. See AT& T, 563 U.S. at 351.
104. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct at 466-68.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 461-71.
107. Id. at 471.

108. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110.

Td. at 476.
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expectations of those who rely on stability in the Court's doctrine, the
arbitration cases have certainly been predictably hostile to class
arbitration. It remains to be seen whether four justices, plus the new
justice to be seated, will have a case that presents a clear opportunity
to reverse the tide toward mandatory arbitration.
B. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez: Settlement Offer in an FLSA Case
Campbell-Ewald Co. v Gomez involved an issue underlying the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, but came to the Supreme Court
as an Article III mootness case under the Constitution."' Under Rule
68, a defendant might make an offer of judgment of "complete relief"
to a plaintiff.112 If the plaintiff does not accept, the argument goes, the
plaintiff does not have a live action anymore. That issue was left open
in a prior case where the Court had assumed without deciding that
the offer of judgment mooted the plaintiff's claim and held that the
particular class claim at issue, without a plaintiff with a live individual
case, was also moot.113 The issue before the Court in Campbell-Ewald
was whether an offer of "complete relief," that is not accepted
actually does moot the plaintiff's claim. 114
There were two questions before the Court on writ of certiorari
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. One issue was whether a
government contractor - in this case Campbell Ewald Co - would

have the sovereign immunity of the federal government. The Court of
Appeals said no, and the Supreme Court agreed.1
The second issue, and the one that occupied more of the Court's
attention, was the Article III mootness issue. Justice Ginsburg,
adopting Justice Kagan's view voiced in dissent to the earlier case,
made the holding clear - the case is not mooted by an unaccepted
settlement offer - and five other Justices joined in that result.116
Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment,
pinning the result on the defendant's improper tender under state
law.1 17 His views on the mootness question suggest that he might be
open to mooting a case where the tender was properly done, but that

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

136 S. Ct 663, 669 (2016).
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct 1523, 1527 (2013).
Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 670-72.
Id. at 674 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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would still leave five justices committed to Justice Kagan's view.
Although his was a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts (as
dissenting judges often do) was quick to point out the limitations of
the Court's opinion in Campbell-Ewald v Gomez."' In a standard optin class action, defense counsel would determine what "complete
relief" would be for the named plaintiff or plaintiffs and then either
deposit a check with the trial court to act as an escrow "in an account
payable to plaintiff" to try to defeat the class action. 119 There is some
question as to when the court would be divested of jurisdiction (e.g.,
is it when the escrow expires, when the certified check is received by
the plaintiff, when the plaintiff cashes the check, or when the funds
are actually in the plaintiff's account). But, because in Gomez v.
Campbell Ewald, the defendant did not do this, this question was not
decided.
Faced with a check made payable to the named plaintiff
presumably for complete relief, plaintiffs' counsel would argue that
Chief Justice Roberts's dissent is just that - a dissent - and might
ignore the tendered check, but, with a fair amount of risk. First,
dissents can sometimes become majority opinions, as it happened
with Justice Elena Kagan's dissent three years earlier in Genesis
HealthCare Corp. v. Symcyzk. 1 2 0 There, Justice Kagan in her dissent
opined that an unaccepted settlement offer of judgment does not
moot a plaintiff's case, which Campbell-Ewald has now made the law
of the land. Second, the plaintiff's lawyers face the risk that what they
see as not being complete relief (because it doesn't include attorney's
fees or injunctive relief) may be considered complete relief by the
court, and that a properly tendered offer of complete relief disposes
of the case. In other words, the court might agree with Justice
Clarence Thomas's concurrence that so long as complete relief is
properly tendered, that should be enough to moot the case.
The risk with any decision like this is that federal courts may be
quite inclined to see the step of placing the funds in an escrow
account, whether with them or a third party, as a further step by the
defendant to try to settle the case and be very hard on named
plaintiffs who do not accept what they deem complete relief. In other
words, it might be a convenient way to clear complex litigation from
their dockets. There should probably be a hearing on why the
118. Id. at 677 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 680.
120. 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013).
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tendered funds are not complete relief, but some district courts may
feel they can decide what complete relief should be without a hearing,
as was arguably the case in Campbell-Ewald (fixed treble statutory
damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 121
All of this tends to be more of a problem for uncertified opt-out
classes than ones that either have gone through the certification
process or which are opt-in collective actions like those under the
FLSA. If the class has been certified, and all named plaintiffs are
offered complete relief, plaintiffs' counsel will be able to get other
plaintiffs to step in the shoes of those who have been offered
complete relief and to keep the court's jurisdiction. If it is an opt-in
collective action under the FLSA, then other plaintiffs who have not
been offered complete relief can keep the case alive after class
certification. This will tend to be less of an issue in FLSA cases, but
also a reason for plaintiffs' lawyers to move as quickly as possible for
class certification. In the end, though, the majority opinion in
Campbell-Ewald v Gomez should serve for some time to cast doubt
on this strategy by defense counsel to defeat class actions.
C. Tyson Foods v Bouaphakeo: Definition of an FLSA Class
Justice Scalia participated in the oral argument in Tyson Foods v.
Bouaphakeo, but not in the final decision. Peg Bouaphakeo, the
representative of pork processing workers in Storm Lake, Iowa at
Tyson Foods, sought compensation for the time workers spent
donning and doffing their gear.122 The issue of working and walking
time under the FLSA has been an active topic of litigation, arising in
the recent cases of IBP v. Alvarez, 123 and Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. 124
In this case the threshold issue was whether the group of workers was
too disparate to have been in class under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 125 The plaintiffs won a $2.9 million verdict
before a jury in federal court for the overtime due to them for
donning and doffing safety equipment. Tyson Foods challenged that
verdict on grounds that the class should never have been certified
121. See id. at 677, 682-83.
122. Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016).
123. 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (holding that the Portal-to-Portal Act does not exclude walking time
between preliminary and postliminary activities from compensable hours worked under the
FLSA).
124. 134 S.Ct. 870, 878 (2014) (holding that the uniforms at issue are "clothes" - the
changing of which can be excluded from hours worked under the FLSA).
125. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1042.
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because of disparate damages each employee suffered, and because
some employees who were not damaged at all might receive
compensation. 21 6 The Court granted certiorari and heard the case with
Justice Scalia on the bench.127
Justice Scalia seemed skeptical of the cohesiveness of the class at
oral argument. 1 28 He was, after all, the author of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a
decision which placed greater scrutiny on the uniformity of
discrimination class actions. 12 9 But the opinion in Bouaphakeo was
issued after Justice Scalia's death, and his vote would not have
affected the outcome of this six to two decision upholding the
workers' jury verdict.130
The primary argument of Tyson Foods rested on the lack of
exactitude in the definition of the class. The defendants argued
against the kind of averaging and calculations that are often done in
"gang-time" shifts that Justice Kennedy in his opinion labeled as
"grueling and dangerous."131 Because the employer did not believe
that this gang time should be counted as hours worked, it did not
keep records of the time, and thus was left to challenge the plaintiff's
expert's calculations.132
The uncertainty of the calculation itself, Tyson Food argued,
meant that the class should not have been certified.133 Justice
Kennedy, joined by five other justices, disagreed in an opinion issued
March 22, 2016134 - over four months after the Court heard argument,
which many suggested was closely divided, and which may have been
due to Justice Scalia's presence on the bench. The Court held that
inferring the liability from expert testimony is permissible under the
FLSA and in accord with Wal-Mart v. Dukes, since the employees
here worked at the same facility, did similar work, and were paid
under the same policy.135
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, which Justice
Alito joined in part. Roberts agreed that the class was valid, but
126. Id. at 1043.
127. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015).
128. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 47, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct.
1036 (2016).
129. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359-60 (2011).
130. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1041.
131. Id. at 1042-43, 1046.
132. See id. at 1047.
133. Id. at 1046.
134. Id. at 1047.
135. Id. at 1048.
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remained concerned as to the District Court's difficulty of individual
damage (or lack thereof) determinations.136 Given the inability of the
District Court to award damages with certainty, part II of the Chief
Justice's opinion, expressed Article III standing concerns about the
many plaintiffs that were undisputedly not damaged.137 Since standing
issues were not properly before the Court, the Chief Justice
concurred in the result, since "[a]s the Court properly concludes, the
problem is not presently ripe for our review."13
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, was so troubled by both
issues that he would have reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings. Justice Thomas
wrote that the majority redefined class action law (as interpreted by
the Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes) and the defendants were thereby
prejudiced with an "unsound special evidentiary rule for cases under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938."139 On the possibility of
uninjured class members being part of the judgment, Justice Thomas
did not believe the defendant's failure to bifurcate the class between
injured and uninjured class members could excuse the deficiencies in
the verdict both as a class action and as a collective, opt-in action
under the FLSA.14 0
Apart from the plaintiffs' holding on to the $2.9 million verdict
they won before a federal court jury, the Bouaphakeo case is
significant to blunt the possible impact of Wal-Mart v. Dukes in FLSA
cases. Many of the presumptions used in wage cases reflect the
importance of minimum wage and overtime protections in the courts,
and the Court recognized the special difficulties in the calculation of
work time while adhering to the due process and Rule 23 concerns
that defendants might have. Obviously, two dissenting justices
believed those concerns were given short shrift. Nevertheless, those
concerns are likely to be raised again in the Court in the future, as
wage and hour class and collective actions continue to proceed apace.
V. ISSUES ON THE FRONT BURNER IN THE NEAR TERM

The most important issues as of this writing are the identities of
the next justices of the United States Supreme Court which will be
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1050 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Id.at 1052-53.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1053-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id. at 1054 n.1.
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chosen by President Trump. The inaction of the Senate majority on
President Obama's nomination of the well-qualified Merrick Garland,
Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, was unprecedented in modern times. The Senate has at least
engaged in the vetting process with all nominees who had not first
been withdrawn over more than the past 100 years, rather than
waiting for the election results. It remains to be seen whether the
Senate Democrats will now mount a similar logjam.
The Court, however, has attempted to continue with its even
number as before, granting certiorari in a small number of cases that
will inevitably increase now that October Term 2016 is underway.
Some of these grants already include cases which will impact
workplace law. The Court granted a petition involving the NLRB, but
not on a close interpretive question about the NLRA, but another
case involving the politics of the last eight years - the constitutionality
of the appointment of Lafe Solomon, the former acting general
counsel of the agency.141 The case recalls the congressional battles
over NLRB recess appointments that wound up in the Supreme
Court and resulted in the invalidation of hundreds of decisions
rendered by a two-person Board in New Process Steel v. NLRB.142 It
will have no effect, though, on the eighty-plus year old NLRA
doctrine.
There are two cases in the pipeline that might have seismic
impacts on traditional labor law doctrine - both emanating from the
Seventh Circuit. The above-discussed prevention of class actions
through mandatory arbitration clauses has for several years been
alleged to violate the concerted activity protections of NLRA Section
7, which allows for the redress of working conditions through mutual
aid and protection, such as the joining together of employees in a
class action. This theory has made its way through the NLRB process
only to be stunted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB.143
Now the Seventh Circuit has addressed the issue, and found that
there is indeed a Section 7 problem with mandatory arbitration
clauses that limit the right of employees to be in class or collective
actions. In Lewis v. Epic Systems, Inc., Chief Judge Diane Wood
141.
NLRB,
142.
143.

NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (granting cert for SW Gen., Inc. v.
796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
560 U.S. 674 (2010).
737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
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wrote a unanimous panel decision striking down the defendant's
attempt to limit class arbitration because of the freezing of
employee's Section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities.'" The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Lewis as well in Morris v.
Ernst & Young LLP, 145 where the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Seventh Circuit and in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 14 6 where the
Fifth Circuit reiterated its contrary position.
Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Wood also gave purchase to another
theory that may be a counter to the union dues issues that were
undecided in Freidrichs, discussed above. Although in a dissenting
opinion in the rejected challenge to the newly-minted Indiana "right
to work" law in Sweeney v Pence, Judge Wood argued that right to
work laws create Fifth Amendment takings clause problems when
union members are required to represent nonmembers but not
compensated at all for that service.147 Although the argument did not
win the day in Indiana, it recently resurfaced in a state trial court in
West Virginia1 48 and will ultimately be litigated higher, possibly in the
Supreme Court, given the recent rapid pace of new right-to-work
laws. Thus, the Supreme Court may next see constitutional challenges
brought by unions, rather than just dissenting employees.
As the Obama Administration nears its end, the DOL has
engaged in several initiatives recently to modernize the statute,
including new regulations on the overtime exemptions to the FLSA,
for executive, administrative and professional employees who earn
above a certain salary threshold. 14 9 The divided nature of government
in Washington has meant that many of the initiatives of the
Department of Labor in the waning years of the Obama
Administrations will be challenged as beyond the power of the
Executive Branch. The overtime regulations which go into effect
December 1, 2016, have been challenged in court5 o and may be

144. 823 F.3d 1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016), cert granted, No. 16-285, 2017 WL 125664.
145. 534 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert granted, No. 16-300, 2017 WL 125665 (Jan. 13, 2017).
146. 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (Jan. 13, 2017).
147. 767 F.3d 654, 674-75, 683-85 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, J. dissenting).
148. Phil Kabler, Right-to-Work Law Blocked; Kanawha Circuit Judge Oks Injunction
Brought by Unions, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL, Aug. 11, 2016, at 1A.
149. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32391 (May 23, 2016) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 541).
150. Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 4:16-CV-00731 (Nov. 2, 2016). The Department has
filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit. Important Information Regarding Recent Overtime
Litigation in the U.S. District Courtof the Eastern District of Texas, supra note 75.
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challenged in Congress in the new session. This is reminiscent of past
rollbacks of agency action on everything from ergonomics standards
to notice posting in workplaces."' Now that the Trump
Administration has takeover, the only thing that is clear is that there
will be many fewer regulations emanating from the Department of
Labor.
One DOL initiative that has already been challenged is the
Administration's update to the disclosures required by the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 for
activities designed to persuade employees in their choice of a
bargaining representative. Business groups, consultants, and
management law firms that do not want to disclose the full scope of
their "union-busting" activities challenged the law in three different
federal courts in spring of 2016.152 They obtained a nationwide
injunction in the Northern District of Texas on the grounds that the
revised Persuader Rule violated the First Amendment, congressional
intent, and a host of attorney client privilege and ethics rules.153
Although revisions to the Persuader Rule are on hold while the
appellate process plays out, as with many other issues, the fact that
Republicans now control the White House and Congress will
determine the direction of the regulatory policy, more than the legal
arguments of attorneys and law professors. 154
VI. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, there will be many other analyses of the
impact of the late Justice Antonin Scalia on workplace law, and the
law generally. Perhaps the greatest impact of his death on workplace

151. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Joint
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (disapproving the Department of Labor's
ergonomics rule).
152. Complaint, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121
(Mar. 31, 2016); Complaint, Labnet, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 16-CV-0844 (PJS/KMM),
2016 WL 3512143 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2016); Complaint, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Perez, No.
4:16CV00169 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30, 2016).
153. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121 (N.D. Tex. June 27,
2016). The Minnesota district court declined to issue such an injunction. Labnet, Inc., No. 16CV-0844 (PJS/KMM), 2016 WL 3512143 (D. Minn. June 22, 2016).
154. I should note my own opinion that the challenges to the DOL's revisions to the
Persuader Rule lack merit and that I am participating as amicus curiae in efforts to lift the
injunction. See also Letter of Law Professors Submitted to the House Education and Workforce
Committee (Mar. 17, 2016) (on file with author) (legal ethics and labor law professors
explaining why the Persuader rules can coexist comfortably with established legal ethics
principles.).
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law over 2015-16 was the continued debate over union dues and
public sector labor rights occasioned by the tie vote in Friedrichs v.
CTA. I have endeavored to look ahead at the debates that loom by
looking at the competing realities that mark so much of the public
discussion of union dues. As shown by the decisions involving
arbitration, class actions, and settlement, procedural concerns
continue to impact strongly the direction of the substantive law. And
as the stalemate between the branches of government shows, the
substantive law will be affected by politics, just as workplace law has
always been.

